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Impressionable Biologies
During the twentieth century, genes were considered the controlling force 
of  life processes, and the transfer of  DNA was the definitive explanation for 
biological heredity. Such views shaped the politics of  human heredity: in the 
eugenic era, controlling heredity meant intervening in the distribution of  
“good” and “bad” genes. However, since the turn of  the twenty- first century, 
this centrality of  genes has been challenged by a number of  “postgenomic” 
disciplines. The rise of  epigenetics in particular signals a shift from notions of  
biological fixedness to ideas of  plasticity and “impressionability” of  biological 
material.
This book investigates the long history of  beliefs about the plasticity of  
human biology, starting with ancient medicine, and analyses the biopolitical 
techniques required to govern such permeability. It looks at the emergence 
of  the modern body of  biomedicine as a displacement or possibly reconfig-
uration of  earlier plastic views. Finally, it analyses the return of  plasticity to 
contemporary postgenomic views and argues that postgenomic plasticity is 
neither a modernistic plasticity of  instrumental management of  the body 
nor a postmodernist celebration of  potentialities. It is instead a plasticity that 
disrupts clear boundaries between openness and determination, individual 
and community, with important implications for notions of  risk, responsi-
bility and intervention.
Maurizio Meloni is a social theorist and a science and technology studies 
scholar. He is the author of  Political Biology (Palgrave 2016), co- editor of  
Biosocial Matters (Wiley 2016)  and chief  editor of  the Palgrave Handbook of  
Biology and Society (2018). He is Associate Professor of  Sociology at Deakin 
University, Australia.
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Problematizing the turn to plasticity
Since the turn of  the twenty- first century, human biology has become seem-
ingly more sensitive and perhaps vulnerable to exposure to biophysical envir-
onments and sociocultural experiences. Scientific claims about the openness 
of  the brain, the body, genome expression and even biological heredity to his-
tory, biography and culture have become increasingly visible over the last two 
decades. Paralleling a similar process in the neurosciences, the powerful rise 
of  epigenetics and the consolidation of  developmental origins of  health and 
disease (DOHaD) since 2000 signals a shift away from notions of  biological 
fixedness and toward ideas of  “impressionability” of  biological material  – 
ideas that seemed forgotten during most of  the twentieth century at the 
peak of  genetic explanations. Rather than being hardwired, gene expression, 
brain structures and biological bodies are rewritten as alterable and capable 
of  modifying themselves in response to pressures from inside and outside 
the body itself. In a word, they are described as plastic. Arguments about 
“biosocial research” and “biosocial entanglement” also reflect this awareness 
of  a multi- causal and multi- level co- determination of  social and biological 
matter, of  what lies beyond and within the skin. Alongside these epistemic 
shifts, a whole new landscape of  ethical and sociological quandaries is rapidly 
unfolding. In this landscape, some of  the conventional dichotomies forged 
during the last century are rapidly becoming obsolete: that biological heredity 
is not environment and environment is not heredity; that cultural factors are 
above the skin and not in the gut, the bones, or the genes; that genes are 
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either the bases of  behaviours or are irrelevant to them; that if  race is a social 
construction, it is not a biological reality; that biological explanations are indi-
vidualistic and erase social factors, while sociocultural explanations omit bio-
logical embedding; that heredity stops at birth and is only contributed to by 
biological parents; that plasticity is counter to biological determinism and 
racialism, and taking the side of  nurture is more progressive than endorsing 
the stability of  traits in developmental debates.
Rather than examining these claims about plasticity directly in a prescrip-
tive fashion, this book takes a longer genealogical perspective to suggest a 
more complicated state of  affairs about the self- proclaimed revolutionary 
nature of  these ideas. This longue durée history focuses on the widespread 
ancient and early modern belief  in the plasticity of  biological matter, its per-
meability to surroundings, the link between environment, food and health, 
and the biopolitical techniques required to govern a porous body. Rather 
than simply the latest episode in a history of  innovation, it sees the present 
challenge to biological fixedness as encompassing the notions of  multiple his-
torical times and perturbingly resonating with older and non- Western epis-
temologies of  the body.
The book problematizes the ubiquitous claim that epigenetics and 
related ideas of  plasticity are “a break from past thinking” about heredity 
(Bonduriansky and Day, 2018). It reminds the reader that past thinking about 
heredity (i.e. genetics) was in itself  a huge (revolutionary) break with trad-
itional views of  heredity and generation.1 These older views displayed some 
of  the characteristics (including a belief  in parental and ancestral influences 
on heredity, especially maternal) that are resurfacing today in the molecular 
language of  twenty- first- century biology (see Zimmer, 2018: 542– 545). If  plas-
ticity means an ongoing interaction with the surrounding environment, and 
biological matter is always nurtured and situated, corporeal plasticity seems 
the standard, not the revolutionary, view in a global history of  body– world 
configurations; at least, that is, before the rise of  the modern biomedical body 
in Europe after the second half  of  the nineteenth century. Rather than an 
explanation of  plasticity, the underlying question emerging from this book is 
the opposite: how did biological fixity (to a certain degree) and abstract uni-
versality of  the body come into being? How did nineteenth- century European 
biology come to suggest an idea of  relative insulation of  the body, heredity 
and internal milieu as a condition for independence, freedom and individu-
ality (Bernard, 1878; Weismann, 1891)? How did such views later come to 
dominate the twentieth century and steer competing paradigms?
By “conjugating” (Anderson, 2009) knowledge and ethical visions of  the 
body generated by the latest advancements in molecular biology with a range 
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of  discourses about biological matter preceding this nineteenth- century 
modernistic break, this book raises questions about the temporality, novelty, 
direction and pace of  change in historical knowledge. It points to a deeper 
genealogical tree for the epigenetic body that is well beyond the controver-
sial “return of  Lamarckism”, given that I situate Lamarckism within a much 
older history of  plasticity of  organisms to their surroundings. When William 
James claims that pre- Darwinians “thought only of  adaptation” and “made 
organisms plastic to environment” (1988), I  take this notion seriously and 
look at it as an intellectual thread to cover periods well before modern evolu-
tionary debates.
To offer an intellectual map beyond twentieth- century biology– society 
debates, Impressionable Biologies follows three axes of  analysis: science, know-
ledge and power.
 1) The scientific axis addresses a growing obsolescence of  modernistic views 
of  the body, biology and heredity based on notions of  a secure and unique 
individual core, a relative separateness from environmental factors, and 
the skin as a well- defined boundary between inner and outer, the bio-
logical and the social. At the scientific level, this obsolescence is mostly 
driven by the awareness of  a growing number of  anomalies in the long- 
held “normal” views of  genetic functioning that were forged during the 
twentieth century. Hype and uncertainties are far from rare in contem-
porary challenges to genetic determinism, and many emerging findings 
in epigenetics or microbiomics still await validation in what is called the 
“postgenomic era”. However, a facile critique that points its finger at sen-
sationalistic findings would obscure the impressive growth of  research 
and integration between emerging programs, which genuinely challenges 
and even violates long- held views in biology. Often the emphasis of  these 
novel findings is about bringing the environment into the genome. And 
yet, one of  the most intriguing aspects of  epigenetic research is not the 
addition of  the environment to an already existing genome, but the entire 
reconfiguration of  the ontology of  the genome. The gene is no longer 
experimented on and represented as an informational medium, but as a 
very material and impressionable body that brings back to actuality ancient 
metaphors of  plasticity as marking and imprinting. This embodied nature 
of  the genome may be used to challenge the flatness of  the digital lan-
guage of  molecular biology.
 2) The knowledge axis extends my previous argument (2016) about a return 
of  the repressed in contemporary epigenetic research, or that scientific 
time future may be  – in some cases at least  – “contained in time past” 
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(Gissis, 2017). However, here, the “repressed” is not just nineteenth- century 
soft heredity but ancient, early modern and non- Western body– world 
configurations based on ideas and practices of  bodily fluidity. Notions like 
the maternal imprint, the specific connection between body and place, the 
environment as a bioactive force, the blurring of  the boundary between 
food and drug, the porosity of  heredity to ancestral events, and even the 
inheritance of  acquired behaviours, pangenesis and telegony (notions 
which have been recently evoked in molecular forms in epigenetics2) have 
always been well known in ancient, early modern and non- Western med-
ical doctrines. It is this molecular resurfacing of  past tropes implied by epi-
genetics that offers a unique opportunity to question polarities between 
“traditional” and “modern” knowledge. By focusing on how bodies are 
rewritten as plastic and vulnerable in epigenetics, the book may con-
tribute not only to challenging the congratulatory rhetoric of  innovation 
in contemporary life sciences but also to focusing on forms of  epistemic 
hybridity where past and present, centre and periphery, global and situated 
exist in a deeply entangled way (Raj, 2013; Anderson, 2014). This means, 
genealogically, the possibility of  a reappraisal of  counter- traditions of  the 
body as genuine sites of  knowledge production. Where one sees the accu-
mulation of  pacified knowledge, genealogy reveals bellicose relationships.
 3) The power axis highlights the complex coproduction of  the political 
and the biological in the history of  the body and the legacy of  the 
politics of  plasticity, at both the individual and the collective level. By 
focusing on the government of  malleable bodies  – always porous to 
environmental influences – the book sheds light on an alternative form 
of  biopolitics and challenges views of  an inherently liberating potential 
of  biological plasticity. Building on the longer history, it dissects the 
contemporary implications of  corporeal and genomic plasticity and 
(re- )emerging connections of  environment and disease for notions of  
risk, responsibility and intervention. If  the body is rewritten as perme-
able to its genomic core, it is also vulnerable to new risks and amen-
able to new forms of  intervention, particularly in special windows of  
biological sensitivity. During these peaks of  plasticity, prevention and 
other policy initiatives are described as more effective, but the lasting 
impacts of  negative experiences are also deemed more significant and 
difficult to correct.
Finally, the book addresses the impact of  epigenetics on existing notions 
of  plasticity in the life sciences. Epigenetic research does not exhaust plasti-
city, a complex term that encompasses multiple research programs in biology, 
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often with competing meanings. However, epigenetics is rapidly becoming a 
key mechanism in several iterations of  plasticity, especially in neuroscience 
and gene expression. Epigenetics, I argue, contributes in this way to shifting 
the overall inflection of  the term across the biosciences. It brings to the fore 
a more complex meaning of  plasticity that is less about potential for reorgan-
ization and optimization and more about absorption of  environmental 
disruptions, inertia and viscosity of  long- term effects. This is somehow a 
bleaker and certainly more sobering inflection of  plasticity, which is far from 
being the opposite of  stability or even fixity (Bateson and Gluckman, 2011). It 
is a plasticity of  enfoldment in ancestral histories and entanglement in places 
that challenges both modernistic and postmodernistic appropriation of  the 
term as, respectively, a property securely in the possession of  the sovereign 
consumer or a symbol for infinite freedom and fluidity of  identity.
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Notes
1 In politics, the term “counter- revolution” is often used to describe a break that 
removes and overturns the conditions of  a previous revolutionary break; however, 
to think of  the current challenges to the modernistic body of  biomedicine (and 
its views of  heredity, reproduction and relationships to the environment) in these 
terms  would render too simplistic the argument here advanced about the coexist-
ence of  multiple temporalities in the history of  science.
2 For molecular versions of  inheritance of  acquired behaviours, see Bohacek and 
Mansuy (2015). For pangenesis (direct communication between somatic and germ 
cells) in which exosomes potentially play the role of  Darwin’s gemmules, see 
Zimmer’s comment (2018: 545) to Cossetti et al. (2014), and Sharma (2017). For 
molecular versions of  telegony (how a previous mate’s features are passed to off-
spring), see Crean et al. (2014).
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An archaeology 
of plasticity
Living in postgenomic times: Of imprinting and plasticity
Claims of  a new entanglement of  bodies and the environment are increas-
ingly relevant in postgenomic models:1 “the life sciences are generating a 
transformative view of  the biological body not as fixed and innate but as 
permeable to its environment and, therefore, plastic” (Mansfield, 2017: 355). 
Since the early 1990s there has been much emphasis on the brain’s synapses 
and gross organization as sculpted by social and cultural influences, even in 
adult life (Clark, 1998; Glannon, 2002; Park and Huang, 2010; Overgaard and 
Jensen 2012; Rees, 2016). Now, fields like environmental epigenetics, develop-
mental origins of  health and disease (DOHaD) and microbiomics lead even wider 
arguments about the dynamism of  biological matter (Charney, 2012; Majnik 
and Lane, 2015; Moore, 2015). These fields have shown how the human body 
is permeable to environmental effects (e.g. toxins, food and socioeconomic 
status) to its genomic core, entangled inseparably “with environmental forces 
(macro and micro) from the moment of  conception on throughout life” 
(Lock, 2015: 151).
A wealth of  evidence has accumulated since the early 2000s that not only 
is the human brain plastic, and hence changeable at the structural and func-
tional level (Rubin, 2009; Rose and Abi- Rached, 2013), but also the micro-
biota and epigenome are moulded by the impact of  food, lifestyle, toxins, 
chemicals, stressors and socioeconomic factors. Environmental or social 
epigenetics is the most well- known example of  this emerging interest in 
the biological embedding of  social experience and the appreciation of  the 
power of  the environment in explaining health trajectories, development and 
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2 An archaeology of plasticity
biological identity. By showing how various material instantiations of  social 
life become literally embodied in the epigenome, epigenetics is said to illus-
trate how the environment gets inside the body and makes “the boundary of  the 
skin of  little significance” (Landecker and Panofsky, 2013: 339, referring to 
Michael Meaney’s work). Chiselled by the incessant workings of  external 
forces, postgenomic bodies are described nowadays as fully absorbed in their 
surroundings (Solomon, 2016):  the boundaries between the body and the 
outside world become uncertain. This is not quite the same as saying that 
genes and environment “interact”, as we have known for the whole of  the 
twentieth century (Hogben, 1933; Tabery, 2014). In postgenomics the envir-
onment is no longer a mere container for gene expression (Stallins et al., 2016); 
it is increasingly seen as a productive, bioactive force (Landecker, 2011), an 
inducer and generator of  phenotypes (West- Eberhard, 2003). Even in terms 
of  biological capitalism, postgenomics introduces a different logic that makes 
not just DNA sequences alone but the “whole spatial and temporal contexts 
and circumstances surrounding DNA” a new potential source of  biovalue 
(Stallins et al., 2016).
Changes in evolutionary thinking are also significant: the formative power 
of  the environment is wielded not only via indirect selective pressures, as in 
the classical neo- Darwinian account; the emerging logic of  epigenetics now 
implies that the environment directly instructs the organism ( Jablonka and 
Lamb, 2014). This reconceptualization has an impact on the way in which 
bodies are rewritten: not just as “reacting to” or “withstanding” the envir-
onment but as “composed of  transduced representations” of  it (Landecker, 
2016:  87). Since external conditions are understood as reflecting directly, at 
the molecular level, in the body’s “internal biological changes”, a model of  
imprint replaces one of  random genetic mutation (Lappé and Landecker, 
2015). Metaphors of  writing, marking, coating and labelling, as well as 
notions of  memory, scars and erasures, have nowadays become widespread 
in the epigenetic landscape.
If  imprint is a key metaphor for conveying the notion that the environment 
leaves a durable mark on the genome, plasticity is probably the word that best 
captures the spirit of  postgenomic times. Plasticity, which the Oxford English 
Dictionary defines as “the ability to be easily moulded or to undergo a per-
manent change in shape”, is a very complex notion. It is too often confused 
with its antonym,2 elasticity. The difference between plasticity and elasticity 
is obvious in the science of  matter. While elasticity is the capacity to regain 
an original form after the deforming pressure has ceased, plasticity is about 
undergoing a permanent change:
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If  a coiled spring is pulled beyond the limits of  elasticity, it will be perman-
ently elongated. Provided that the spring does not break, the change is 
plastic.
(Bateson and Gluckman, 2011: 31)
However, this distinction is more blurred in biology, where plasticity 
often flirts with elasticity or even polymorphism (the possibility to assume 
a nearly infinite number of  forms), and is too often taken as equivalent 
to “change”, “malleability”, “reversibility” or “tractability”. Its multifarious 
history reveals, however, a more complex polysemy, and an association 
with ideas of  stabilization and retaining of  forms after a perturbation. This 
connotation of  plasticity as continuous with stabilization (Bateson and 
Gluckman, 2011), which had been neglected in modern writings, is coming 
powerfully back to the fore nowadays. As I will argue in this book, this is 
mostly an effect of  emerging claims in epigenetics and related programs 
such as DOHaD, which explains health trajectory as the durable result of  
in utero effects.
Contemporary plasticity
Plasticity is today a trendy catchall term “encompassing multiple processes 
regulated in a variety of  different ways” (Bateson and Gluckman, 2011: 5). In 
contemporary life science, plasticity appears in many guises: synaptic, mor-
phological, immunological, not to mention psychic, behavioural and mental. 
Plasticity spans a number of  cutting- edge research programs, including 
cloning and stem cells (plasticity as reprogramming of  cell fate), immun-
ology (producing antibodies to pathogens not encountered before), neurosci-
ence (plasticity as rewiring of  synaptic connections, even in the adult brain), 
and epigenetics (malleability of  genomic expression). Due to their impact on 
notions of  corporeal plasticity, phenotypic and developmental plasticity are 
the two areas of  major interest in this book. Phenotypic plasticity is “the ability 
of  individual genotypes to produce different phenotypes when exposed to 
different environmental conditions” (Pigliucci et  al., 2006; Nicoglou, 2015, 
2018); developmental plasticity (which looks at the same phenomenon from 
a developmental angle and is often used as a synonym) is usually defined as 
the capacity of  an organism or the body to react to an environmental input 
“with a change in form, state, movement, or rate of  activity” (West- Eberhard, 
2003: 34). Reference to these notions brings to the forefront the capacity of  
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humans to adjust quickly and flexibly in “heterogeneous environments” 
(Gabriel et al., 2005; Kuzawa and Bragg, 2012), relying less on forms of  “gen-
etic commitment” (Wells, 2012: S470).
Given this multifaceted situation, the semantic “unity” of  the term is by 
itself  questionable. As scholars in Science and Technology Studies (STS) know, 
it is best in this case to understand scientific terms as the result of  a com-
plex negotiation across multiple scientific communities shaped by different 
“research questions, [and] practices of  scientific measurement” (Pitts- Taylor, 
2016: 36). Plasticity, therefore, ultimately comes in the plural, and genealogy 
is exactly what is needed to diffract this polysemy of  the term into its multiple 
instantiations.
The flourishing status of  plasticity in several scientific research 
programs and social science writings shows a significant discontinuity with 
last- century debates. One visible case is evolutionary biology. For a large 
part of  the twentieth century, with few pioneering exceptions, the term 
was considered a simple “nuisance” (Forsman, 2015: 276; see alternatives 
in Weber and Depew, 2003; Morange, 2009; Nicoglou, 2018). A  key text 
of  twentieth- century neo- Darwinism, Ernst Mayr’s 800- page Growth of  
Biological Thought (1982), features the word “plastic” just twice, firstly to 
be criticized as an antiquated view and secondly in the sense of  modern 
surgery. The contemporary scenario is very different. Plasticity research 
“has grown tremendously from ten papers published per year before 
1983 to nearly 1300 papers in 2013” (Forsman, 2015:  282). This increase 
is paralleled only by that of  epigenetics, which has escalated in the last 
decade by comparable figures (Meloni and Testa, 2014; Skinner, 2015). The 
two areas support each other and in several cases even overlap, with epi-
genetics offering a plausible molecular but non- genetic mechanism for bio-
logical plasticity and rapid adaptation to changing environments (Kuzawa 
and Bragg, 2012). In terms of  its social translation, “plasticity” is currently 
used to describe the openness of  the body and the brain to complex envir-
onmental interactions throughout life, and particularly in specific critical 
periods of  heightened sensitivity (especially early- life experiences). It is 
invoked to mark a shift from premillennial notions of  biological fixed-
ness and genetic hardwiring. It is used as a powerful rhetorical platform 
drenched in hope to suggest that brains can reprogram and repair them-
selves and bodies are always open to forms of  intervention to optimize 
biological fitness, enhance therapeutic potential and even correct past 
injustice (Duffau, 2006; Moller, 2006; Rubin, 2009; Rose and Abi- Rached, 
2013; Lloyd, 2018; Lloyd and Raikhel, 2018).
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Plasticity, especially in social science quarters, has a strong allure, and is very 
often captured into a discourse of  social progress. Boas famously played the card 
of  the “instability or plasticity” of  human racial types (Boas, 1912: 557) against 
typological racists and American eugenists, inaugurating a long tradition of  
liberal anthropology based on plasticity against biological fixedness. The post- 
Boasian tradition further reinforced this association of  values, neatly aligning a 
discourse of  fixity with one of  exclusion and a discourse of  plasticity with one 
of  emancipation. This polarized strategy was probably favoured by the specific 
research design that American anthropology privileged (Hulse, 1981): physical 
changes (such as increase in stature) in the descendants of  poor or rural migrants 
moving to the USA (Shapiro and Hulse, 1939; Goldstein, 1943; see also Lasker, 
1952, 1954). In her review, Bernice Kaplan (1954) discusses twenty- five studies on 
human plasticity, of  which only a few referred overtly to its negative effects, one 
written by a non- American author (Ivanovsky, 1923, on the effects of  inanition in 
Russia). This debate is so value- laden that nowadays, one century later, attacking 
Boas’ study (Sparks and Jantz, 2003) still has deep political implications.
However, this one- sidedly emancipatory use of  the term “plasticity” is 
one of  the most important obstacles to an appreciation of  its plurality of  
meaning. Plasticity is an inherently dualistic term, caught between openness 
and determination, agency and vulnerability (Paillard, 1976; Malabou, 2005; Pitts- 
Taylor, 2016). Analogous to the Greek phármakon, which can cure and poison 
at the same time (Derrida, 1981), plasticity in emerging styles of  epigenetic 
reasoning is the domain of  a profound indecision compatible with conflicting 
social and ethical scenarios (Lloyd, 2018; Lloyd and Raikhel, 2018). This fun-
damental ambiguity of  the concept of  plasticity between creation, reception 
and annihilation of  forms (Malabou, 2005; see also 2009, 2010) will be turned 
in this book into a heuristic for unpacking its rich polysemy across various 
epochs. A longue durée and non- linear history of  the plastic body shows how 
each of  its conceptual facets may have become prevalent in certain histor-
ical moments, at the expense of  others. Its ambiguity becomes here the very 
source of  its productiveness (Rheinberger, 2003).
Plasticity, etymology and history
Even a quick look at the etymology and recent history of  the term aptly 
demonstrates some of  the traps connected with it. As for its etymology, plas-
ticity comes from the Greek plassein, which means to mould, shape or form, 
and by extension, to fabricate, forge, sculpt and train someone; hence the 
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adjective plastikos, a thing to which a form can be assigned, but also all the arts 
and techniques by which a form can be produced:
“Plastic” as an adjective has two meanings. On the one hand, it means 
“to be susceptible to changes of  form” or “to be malleable.” Clay, in 
this sense, would be “plastic.” On the other hand, it means “having 
the power to bestow form,” as in the expression “plastic surgeon” or 
“plastic art” understood as “the art of  modelling” in the arts of  sculp-
ture or ceramics. Plasticity describes the nature of  that which is plastic, 
being at once capable of  receiving and of  giving form.
(Malabou, 2005: 65)
A similar polarity arises when observing the nature of  plastic matter. In his 
Meteorology, Aristotle highlights the singular nature of  plasticity as located 
between two poles: a hardness that resists all modifications, and a softness 
or fluidity that does not retain any. Notably, this definition came many cen-
turies before William James’ often cited and, in fact, derivative definition of  
plasticity as “semi- inertness” – “the possession of  a structure weak enough to 
yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at once” (1890: 105; my 
italics).3 Aristotle writes:
Some things, e.g. copper and wax, are impressible, others, e.g. pottery 
and water, are not. […] Those impressibles that retain the shape 
impressed on them and are easily moulded by the hand are called 
“plastic”; those that are not easily moulded, such as stone or wood, or 
are easily moulded but do not retain the shape impressed, like wool or 
a sponge, are not plastic. The last group are said to be “squeezable”.
(Book IV, part 9: Webster, 1923)
In another work, On Memory and Reminiscence, Aristotle offers the example 
of  “running water”, on which no form could be implanted, as a case of  a 
material too fluid to be considered “plastic” (2014).
Plasticity belongs, therefore, in this intermediate space between ability to 
change and capacity to retain a shape, “between the opposing moments of  
total immobility and vacuity”, fixedness and dissolution (Malabou, 2005: 12). 
It often overlaps with the apparently opposite notion of  robustness (insensi-
tivity to environmental changes), which is part of  the same gradual con-
tinuum (Bateson and Gluckman, 2011). These semantic tensions, as we shall 
see, are inherent in the definition of  plasticity and have not gone away in 
contemporary debates.
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The modern historical trajectory of  the term also presents a number 
of  traps. From Aristotle’s definition to Herder’s eighteenth- century book 
Plastik (on plastic arts like sculpture) (1778 [2002]), plasticity belongs to the 
realm of  inanimate matter, not living organisms. I will explore in the next 
pages a rare exception to this, in Renaissance embryological debates around 
the Neoplatonic notion of  a vis plastica (plastic power: Smith, 2006; Hirai, 
2007a). However, albeit not exclusive, the non- biological sense of  plasti-
city remained predominant until Herder’s time, when the term started 
to significantly increase in all the many European languages.4 Besides re- 
elaborating some of  the Greek themes about giving and receiving forms, 
Herder’s book adds a further twist to the meanings associated with plasti-
city. He uses the term in a strong polemic against the modern primacy of  
sight versus touch, painting versus sculpture. While sight has a destructive 
function, to transform everything “into planes and surfaces”, plastic arts 
like sculpture create an experience of  the in- depth, of  a three- dimensional 
body (1778 [2002]). Plastic is here the opposite not of  fixed, but of  flat, 
superficial, two- dimensional. So far, plasticity is not associated with mod-
ernistic ideas of  continuous change, regeneration, tractability, improve-
ment, or optimization.5
This is, instead, the meaning that plasticity would gradually acquire when 
it was imported since the nineteenth century into the biological and med-
ical sciences. Here it was used to convey the idea of  adaptability to envir-
onmental changes and, in medicine and neuroscience, renewal of  tissues, 
memory formation, creation of  new brain structures and potentiation of  
synaptic strengths (Stahnisch, 2003; Berlucchi and Buchtel, 2008; Overgaard 
and Jensen, 2012).
At the turn of  the twentieth century, in the evolutionary writings of  James 
Mark Baldwin, plasticity became a principle above natural selection to explain 
the evolution of  intelligence and learning (Baldwin, 1902; Weber and Depew, 
2003). Baldwin made plasticity a keystone of  advancement toward higher 
stages of  life (Spencer, a generation before, actually did the same, often with 
a racialist tinge). He posited that a correlation between
increasing plasticity of  the nervous system and increasing mental 
endowment holds as we ascend from a lower to a higher stage [in the 
scale of  life].
(1902: 36)
This association of  plasticity with progress is even clearer in the work of  
another psychologist, Pavlov. In his 1930s neurological writings, Pavlov 
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described the higher nervous system as plastic, because of  its “immense pos-
sibilities” and endless capacity to change. In plasticity, he claimed,
nothing remains stationary, unyielding and everything could always be 
attained, all could be changed for the better, were only the appropriate 
conditions realized.
(1932: 127, cited in Weidman, 2006: 79; see Todes, 2014: 524)
It is this utopian sense that we still find today in claims of  “irreducible 
openness” of  the plastic brain (Rees, 2016). What we can here notice is that, 
from this point onwards, the new plasticity of  modern biology left behind the 
original meaning of  plasticity in the sciences of  matter. This latter implied a 
process of  irreversible loss of  possibility and inability to recover an initial form 
(Malabou, 2005: 34). In sculpture, plastic art par excellence, the immense poten-
tialities of  a block of  marble or a piece of  wood are irrevocably transformed 
into a statue: once the material has been shaped and carved, and of  all the 
possible figures only one has been crystallized into its final form, there is no 
way back. The statue can be destroyed, but it cannot be undone, un- formed 
and restored to its original state.
There is nothing wrong or surprising in the fact that a scientific term 
accumulates a number of  often opposing meanings along its trajectory 
through different vocabularies and paradigms (Canguilhem, 1955). But it is 
sociologically significant to highlight the crystallization of  values between 
plasticity, potential for change, educability and progress during the course 
of  the twentieth century. It is significant because it blinds us to the reality 
that emerging models of  biological life may represent a departure from this 
one- sided view of  plasticity, pointing instead to a less teleological and more 
complex, if  not darker, meaning.
The dialectic of plasticity in contemporary social life
Outside of  the life sciences, human plasticity has often remained the province 
of  biological anthropologists, very far from sociological radars. However, 
things may be rapidly changing, given the widespread usage of  the term to 
describe both processes of  corporeal modification and biological embedding 
of  social exposures that often come in socially stratified ways (Pitts- Taylor, 
2016). It is enough to quickly scan a number of  popular science books to 
realize that the social circulation of  claims about the plasticity of  the brain 
and the body becomes more visible by the day. These stories, however, are 
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not neutral or homogeneous. They are often divided into two very different 
strands that nicely capture the subtle paradoxes of  plasticity. When it comes 
to the possibility of  successfully manipulating our brain, genome, or micro-
biota to become a better us (better mood, better health and better mind), 
plasticity is mostly sold to a global middle class as a rosy message of  indi-
vidual control and optimization of  function. It highlights how we can “train” 
and regenerate our brain and now our genomic expression through medita-
tion, healthy diet, or exercise (Doidge, 2008; Shenk, 2010; Reynolds, 2014; 
Douglas, 2015; Le Doux, 2015). It builds on and expands an ideology of  
individual consumption and personal freedom deployed in the service of  
neoliberal and marketized models of  health. Its popular versions emphasize 
choice, control and reversibility. It is possible today, we are told, to stimulate 
“new brain cells and networks where and when we need them” as well as 
to turn “genes off  and on at will to repair brain damage, restore function, 
and optimize performance” (Horstman 2010: 8). In other popular accounts, 
epigenetics is described as offering hope that everyone can become a genius 
(Shenk, 2010), challenging the hard truth of  a genetic basis for IQ as in past 
sociobiological accounts. This is the perfect version of  biological plasti-
city for a culture where “care of  the self  is always about self- improvement, 
enhancement, and becoming something better” ( Jones, 2008; Berkowitz, 
2017: 33).
However, this is not the only phenomenology of  plasticity that exists, 
though it is the one that has been most studied by sociologists (Papadopoulos, 
2011; Rose and Abi- Rached, 2013; Pitts- Taylor, 2016; Berkowitz, 2017). 
A different, darker and more viscous plasticity, one that highlights irreversi-
bility and loss of  control, relates not to individual consumers but to vulner-
able populations in Euro- America and increasingly more the Global South.6 
If  plasticity lies in a paradoxical mid- way between the power to shape and 
the susceptibility to receive forms, it is vulnerable human groups, rather than 
individual consumers, that take upon them this second meaning: the burden 
of  plasticity, that is, being sculpted by overwhelming social forces beyond 
their control. This is where plasticity should sound familiar to sociologists: it 
describes not only a faculty available to an individual agent (a habit that is a 
“possession” or a “disposition,” as in the Latin and Greek etymology) but a 
power of  transmission of  social structures through embodied dispositions 
and practices. This is closer to ideas of  modes of  reproduction, inherit-
ance and habitus in Bourdieu’s term, something that cuts across a dualism 
of  structure and agency, community and individual body (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1979; Bourdieu, 1986; Crossley, 2013). Its contemporary rephrasing 
as biohabitus (Warin et al., 2015) is probably even more pertinent to describe 
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the entanglement of  biological and social environments that is at stake with 
emerging models of  biosocial life.
Contemporary analyses of  biosocial plasticity are very close to this socio-
logical insight about a non- individualistic reproduction of  social life. They 
don’t see a chasm between individual and social bodies, and don’t under-
stand biological factors as operating within the skin of  the individual, as fixed 
at birth, or as socially insensitive to the effects of  social structures. Quite 
the opposite. Even Bourdieu’s notion of  capital is explicitly mobilized and 
expanded to cover new areas (for instance “maternal capital”) in an effort 
to “facilitate integration” between sociological and biological explanations 
(Wells, 2010).
However, these models of  human plasticity understand the reproduction 
of  biosocial life in a specific way. Whether it is the lasting legacy of  child 
abuse (Cecil et  al., 2016), racial violence or antenatal depression in post- 
apartheid South Africa (Redinger et  al., 2017), the incidence of  diabetes in 
urban India (Gluckman and Hanson, 2012), the Aboriginal health gap and 
transgenerational trauma in Australia (Berger et  al., 2017), the everyday 
effects of  racism (Kuzawa and Sweet, 2009), or the long- term ones of  slavery 
for Black Americans ( Jasienska, 2009), environmental effects deemed to 
make a visible impression on bodies and brains are seen mostly in nega-
tive terms:  pollutants, malnutrition or overnutrition, violence and trauma. 
Sometimes these effects are even seen to travel across generations. A biology 
sculpted by environmental events appears mostly in its pathological dimen-
sion. This is probably the most visible contrast with earlier studies of  human 
plasticity that referred (mostly) to the positive effects of  favourable environ-
ments on the bodies of  immigrants.
The connection between plasticity and progress seems less visible in 
emerging biosocial models. These are not just some gloomy findings on the 
powerful effects of  environmental insults, though. With the understanding 
of  this special porosity of  human biology and its susceptibility to possible 
damage from the environment, an anxious vigilance emerges. If  our bodies are 
permeable to their genomic core, should we not monitor people’s lifestyles 
more carefully than ever (Wastell and White, 2017)? And which people in par-
ticular? Not all bodies are considered equally permeable. If  it is in the womb 
that many epigenetic effects are “programmed”, should intensified attention 
and obligations be placed on pregnant women (Warin, 2012; Richardson 
et al., 2014; Mansfield, 2017)? Should they be monitored even before concep-
tion (for a wider reading of  pre-pregnancy care: Waggoner, 2017)?
Consider the theory of  the developmental origins of  health and disease 
(DOHaD) or “foetal programming” (Gluckman and Hanson, 2005). DOHaD 
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originates from the work of  British physician David Barker, who brought to 
attention the long- term health effects (cardiovascular disease, diabetes) of  
events occurring in critical moments of  fetal development. The notion was 
far from new, but Barker was an enthusiastic propagator and a catalyst for 
the idea (the “Barker Hypothesis”) that many chronic diseases in adult life 
have intra- uterine roots (Almond and Currie, 2011; Warin et al., 2015). Initial 
fetal programming studies focused on epidemiological statistical correlations 
between “conditions of  early- life and later- life health in historical cohorts in 
British public records and turned them into clinical and experimental physio-
logical problems” (Buklijas, 2018:  180; Adair and Prentice, 2004). These 
studies, originally labelled “foetal origins of  adult disease” (Hales and Barker, 
1992; Barker, 1995; Paul, 2010), mostly focus on the negative effects of  in utero 
events (pollutants, stress, over or under nutrition, smoking) in increasing the 
risk of  non- communicable disease later in life.
Interestingly, with their findings translated in related campaigns such as 
The First 1,000 Days (Pentecost, 2018), DOHaD studies in the Global South 
are making their way to the forefront of  works in developmental plasticity. 
Since its founding meeting in Mumbai in 1990, DOHaD has always had a 
Southern focus (Pentecost, 2018), but this has become more visible in the last 
years. It is the case of  economically emerging regions (such as India or China) 
that are undergoing dramatic nutrition transition (adoption of  Western diet) 
and are characterized by cyclical patterns of  intergenerational metabolic 
and coronary disease (Yajnik, 2001; Adair and Prentice, 2004; Watson et al., 
2017). India, in particular, is home of  the Pune Maternal Nutritional Study, 
which has gained international status as an explanatory model for long- term 
developmental effects of  maternal undernutrition on diabetes epidemics 
in several Southern countries (Krishnaveni and Yajnik, 2017). The so- called 
“thin– fat” Indian baby syndrome – how Indian babies are “thin morphologic-
ally but metabolically obese according to [their] impaired insulin sensitivity 
and elevated levels of  lipids” (Solomon, 2016: 22; Yajnik, 2004) – has come to 
popularly represent the notions of  an epigenetic (developmental) origin, as 
opposed to a genetic origin.
Not only is the importation of  Western diet at stake in these emer-
ging studies in the Global South. It is also the case of  poorer areas where 
DOHaD- related studies investigate the lasting effects of  war, genocide and 
famine in hindering social and economic growth: studies have investigated 
the transgenerational transmission of  stress via epigenetic mechanisms in 
women exposed during pregnancy to the Tutsi genocide or the long- term 
effects of  nutrient restriction on offspring growth in rural Gambia (Perroud 
et al., 2014; Norris and Richter, 2016; Dasgupta, 2017; Eriksen et al., 2017).
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Economists are also coming to use these developmental studies of  shocks 
in human populations. Awareness of  the long- term effects of  plasticity has 
inspired recent macro- economic analyses of  the “developing world” that rec-
ommend investments during critical windows of  plasticity (pregnancy and 
early childhood) in an effort to foster economic growth and improve human 
capital. An emerging body of  literature in health economics, which includes 
also influential economists like Nobel Prize winner James Heckman (2012), 
asks: “what if  the nine months in utero are one of  the most critical periods in a 
person’s life, shaping future abilities and health trajectories – and thereby the 
likely path of  earnings?” (Almond and Currie, 2011: 1; Almond et al., 2012). 
In this new operationalization of  plasticity, “economics goes into the womb 
not only under the skin” (Wastell and White, 2017) – particularly the wombs 
of  those living in “developing regions” (Currie and Vogl, 2013), or exposed to 
systematic stressors in “developed” ones. Drawing on plasticity rather than 
genetic fixedness, a new biopolitical management of  vulnerable populations 
is emerging.
A genealogy of plastic power
In order to understand the polysemic meaning of  plasticity as referring to 
both control and loss of  control, capacity to remake oneself  at will and 
realizing one’s vulnerability to overwhelming forces in the near past and 
the present, reversibility and irreversibility, I  suggest in this book an exer-
cise in genealogical thought. Rather than address directly emerging forms 
of  biopower and governmentality based on plasticity and related epigenetic 
notions, I prefer to take a longer genealogical perspective and show the com-
plexity of  the sociological discourses associated with the government of  cor-
poreal plasticity in ancient and early modern times.
In the specific meaning conferred on it first by Nietzsche and later by 
Foucault, a genealogical analysis connects “untimely” histories (Nietzsche, 
1873/ 1997) to reveal complex filiations and struggles among competing epi-
stemic paradigms (Foucault, 2003; Koopman, 2013).
Genealogy is an eminently sociological task (Rose, 1996; Greco, 1998; 
Diedrich, 2005) for showing the social and interactive nature of  what is often 
taken for granted in narrow presentist interpretations (Aspers, 2007). It is a form 
of  history of  the present that examines the conditions under which certain 
powers and practices come into being. As such, it contributes to a problematiza-
tion of  historical sedimentations that obscure the contingency of  the present 
social and intellectual order (Dean, 2003), and may build stimulating bridges 
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with various areas of  sociological research, including historical sociology. This 
disclosing task of  genealogy is well summed up by social theorist Ed Cohen:
Genealogy’s basic premise holds that the world is much more virtual 
and much more mutable than it presents itself. In genealogy we disclose 
contingencies secreted within phenomena which propose themselves 
to us as the essential dimensions of  our world. Through this disclosure, 
genealogy hopes to glimpse instabilities where we often see inevitabil-
ities, to imagine possibilities where we resign ourselves to necessities, 
and thus to learn to think and live otherwise than we supposed imagin-
able heretofore.
(2009: 23)
My genealogical approach to contemporary plasticity builds on 
Foucauldian archaeology. Archaeology aims at describing discursive practices 
and epistemic formations while abandoning neat normative distinctions 
between subjected and authorized knowledge (Chimisso, 2003). Albeit it is 
often believed that genealogy replaces archaeology, it is more correct to say 
that, in Foucault, genealogy supplements archaeology. Foucault’s endeavour 
can therefore be properly described as an “archaeological- and- genealogical 
inquiry into the emergence into being of  related vectors of  knowledge, 
power, and ethics” (Koopman, 2013: 44).
In this book, I  follow a Foucauldian strategy to challenge the naïve and 
Eurocentric notion that plasticity has, until today, been silenced, pacified and 
marginalized in favour of  a biology of  fixedness; that fixedness has prevailed 
for centuries with its neat distinction between the interior of  the body and the 
outer environment, and hence between nature and nurture; that plasticity is 
somehow a late gift of  modernity, the effect of  incremental scientific advance 
that has overthrown a centuries- long metaphysics of  fixedness; and that only 
under a fixed view of  biology do racism, eugenics and biological determinism 
became possible, with all of  their enormous political consequences. Many 
of  these assumptions do not withstand further examination. Perhaps more 
importantly, genealogy helps displace the notion that plasticity is a unitary 
phenomenon, coming in the abstract. It helps illuminate the unequal distribu-
tion of  different forms of  plasticities across social, gender and ethnic groups – 
inequality that alters the risks individuals face, the responsibilities imputed 
to them, and the interventions to which they may be subject. Genealogy 
serves as a healthy reminder that histories of  corporeal plasticity have always 
been highly gendered, racialized and classed, mapping and reproducing 
hierarchies through physiological distinctions (Paster, 1993). Rather than 
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being inherently liberating, as many think, plasticity is ambiguously situated 
between making and unmaking essentialist notions of  class, gender and race. 
It can be used to promote post- racial views that get rid of  racial essences 
or arguments that once again lock people to place, time and the burden of  
experience. Racialization in science is not a matter of  choosing plastic over 
fixed biology, epigenetics over genetics.
Plasticity and its troubled history: When we were  
plastic and how we forgot it
The possibility of  a genealogy of  plasticity seems to fly in the face of  what 
many disciplinary chronologies in the life sciences tell us:  that biological 
plasticity is a recent invention based on the discovery of  some properties in 
our cells or neurons that were previously overlooked by constructions that 
emphasized stability and permanency. We are led to believe that an original 
metaphysics of  fixedness in Western views of  the body has been followed 
by a perception of  plasticity driven by recent innovative research programs. 
Certainly, this narrative is mostly valid for various local branches of  the life 
sciences (cell differentiation and culture: Landecker, 2007, see also Kraft and 
Rubin, 2016; neuroplasticity:  Berlucchi and Buchtel, 2008; Rose and Abi- 
Rached, 2013; Rees, 2016; and plant biology:  Baranski and Peirson, 2015). 
However, it does not hold true when we think of  whole- body plasticity and 
notions like race or heredity. When extended to these wider aspects of  human 
biology, it would be more correct to say that generalized plasticity preceded fix-
edness. If  we define plasticity as above – the capacity of  an organism to change 
in response to an environmental change (West- Eberhard, 2003) – the experi-
ence of  plasticity is literally everywhere in ancient, early modern and non- 
Western understandings of  the body.7 As any historian of  medicine knows, 
the belief  in malleability of  traits, and a continuous capacity to adjust the 
human body to a change in place, winds or food, was largely predominant 
before the rise of  the modern biomedical body. This plasticity of  traits may 
still be today the signature of  a certain Southern understanding of  human 
biology (Anderson, 2014).
It is particularly through humoralism and its global ramifications that the 
biopolitical problem of  how to live with a permeable body became pervasive 
in premodern times. Humoralism, the doctrine that the body is composed 
of  elementary fluids (humours) whose balance was altered by changes in the 
surrounding environment, implies a view of  the body as radically embedded 
in places (Rosenberg, 2012). Bodies are “characterized by a constant exchange 
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between inside and outside, by fluxes and flows” (Nash, 2006: 32); they are, 
to paraphrase Deleuze, “made of  contracted water, earth, light and air” 
(1994: 73). A fluid body, however, is also one that requires intense vigilance 
and control. Moreover, humoralist authors applied this basic instability of  
bodily traits to wider biological phenomena, including reproduction and 
what we call today heredity. Even the notion of  the inheritance of  acquired 
characteristics, and the interplay of  nurture and nature in shaping heredity, 
attributed to Lamarck, is actually clearly part of  the humoralist imagination, 
for instance in the Hippocratic On Airs, Waters, and Places, a key text of  Greek 
humoralism (Chapter 2).
Ancient plasticity is not exhausted by humoralism, however. It is more 
accurate to say that in the premodern world, humoralism worked as a cata-
lyst for a vast number of  tropes about corporeal and racial plasticity that went 
well beyond its language and were widespread from the Greek to the Arabic 
and Indian world. Humoralism was just one among many possible views of  
corporeal plasticity and biological impressionability in medicine, philosophy 
and geography. Take, for instance, the notion that racial traits were directly 
shaped by environmental factors, the sun or cold, food or stars. Theories of  
racial malleability were used to explain ethnic diversity in the ancient world. 
Often combined with a strong moralistic flavour (Livingstone, 1991), they 
condemned whole human groups to inferiority because of  the unfavour-
able environment they were shaped by or, more subtly, by claiming that their 
placement in particularly unfavourable places was a sign of  their subordinate 
nature. In the pseudo- Aristotelian Problemata, after a connection is made 
between the excesses of  climate and brutality of  character, we read that “the 
Ethiopians and the Egyptians” are “bandy- legged”, possibly because “their 
bodies become distorted by heat, like logs of  wood when they become dry”. 
“The condition of  their hair”, the author claims, in an obvious moralistic use 
of  geography, “supports this theory; for it is curlier than that of  other nations, 
and curliness is as it were crookedness of  the hair” (book IV:  “Problems 
connected with the effect of  locality on temperament”; see Foster, 1927: 902). 
Other notions were less moralistic but not less important. Take, for instance, 
the role of  the moon in shaping the morphology and inner nature of  earthly 
bodies. Soranus of  Ephesus, the author of  the most important gynaecological 
treatise of  the second century CE, notes the shrinking of  a mouse’s liver lobes 
with the waning of  the moon; the Roman writer Pliny the Elder (ce 23– 79), in 
his encyclopaedic Historia Naturalis, highlights the growth of  shellfish with its 
waxing. Pliny writes that “it is certain also, that the Bodies of  Oysters, Mussels, 
Cockles, and all Shell- fishes, grow and waste by the Power of  the Moon”. He 
also states that “in the small liver of  the mouse the number of  lobes corresponds 
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to the day of  the moon” (Pliny, 1991: book I, 41 and book II, 76; cfr. Barton, 
1994). Although many considered Pliny’s treatise the source of  naïve beliefs in 
ancient times,8 Pliny, in fact, can be seen as part of  a centuries- long tradition 
of  belief  in lunar effects. These views were still recognized as true in the mid- 
seventeenth century by the English royal physician Walter Charleton,
who in 1654 explained that shellfish grew larger at full moon, perhaps 
because of  the “Moon’s great Humidity” developed from the lunar 
seas, “as the most and best of  our Modern Astronomers have believed”.
(Schaffer, 2010: 159; see also Harrison, 2000)
A few years later, the German (or Dutch) anatomist Dirk Kerckring noted 
in his influential Spicilegium anatomicum (1670) the story of
a young gentlewoman whose beauty depended upon the lunar force, 
insomuch that at full moon she was plump and very handsome, but in 
the decrease of  the planet so wan and ill- favoured that she was ashamed 
to go abroad.
(cited in Schaffer, 2010: 159)
The power of  the moon was extremely important in the ancient and early 
modern world. Generally speaking, the logic was that, as the queen of  heaven, 
the moon ruled over the fluids in the sublunary world (the part of  the cosmos 
opposed to heaven, according to Aristotelian cosmology). Below the heavens, 
whatever is of  watery nature will be affected by the moon’s movements. 
Several centuries after Pliny, Albert the Great (1200– 1280) wrote that it was 
“especially the eyes, in whose composition water’s nature abounds”, that 
“receive the greatest alterations and increases and diminutions according to 
the moon” (Resnick and Albertus Magnus, 2010: 53). The opinion was shared 
by other key scholastic thinkers in Latin West. Robert Grosseteste (1175– 
1253), bishop of  Lincoln, had explicitly linked lunar movements to brain 
alterations. Since we know
“by experience that, of  all the heavenly substances, the moon exercises 
the greatest control over moist and cold bodies” Grosseteste wrote, 
“certain people are called lunatics because, when the moon wanes, they 
suffer a diminution of  the cerebrum, since the cerebrum is a cold and moist 
substance”.
(Dales and Grosseteste, 1966: 461, my emphasis; 
see also Laird, 1990).
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The special influence of  lunar and solar rays on health and disease was a 
key theme of  Arabic medical astrology (iatromathematics) from the eighth 
century onward (Meyerhof, 1931; Klein- Franke, 1984; Siddiqui, 1996; Saif, 
2017). It continued as a respectable medical theory in the West well into 
the eighteenth century, as seen, for instance, in Richard Mead’s Of  the 
Power and Influence of  the Sun and Moon on Humane Bodies (1708) (Harrison, 
2000; cfr. Roos, 2000) and even later with Erasmus Darwin’s Zoonomia 
(1794–96).9
Plasticity before plasticity: A longer history
By assembling these disparate bodies of  knowledge about “ancient plas-
ticity”, I  do not mean to suggest that people have long understood its 
molecular mechanisms and evolutionary significance, or that Grosseteste’s 
passage can be used to date back neuroplasticity to Latin scholasticism of  
the thirteenth century. I am not looking here for a theory of  predecessors, 
and I  do not want to reify past traditions and practices of  the body as a 
finished package of  ideas or a stable referent that can immediately speak 
to our present concerns. I  agree that the current understanding of  plasti-
city is indeed a product of  recent discoveries in neuroscience and molecular 
biology, made possible once scientists began to discard late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth- century notions of  stability and permanency. However, a 
deeper and more pluralistic history of  how living organisms were under-
stood demonstrates that corporeal plasticity is not an event enabled by 
the linear unfolding of  scientific innovation. Rather, a range of  discourses, 
practices and ethical visions have stubbornly persisted and resurface today 
in the hype, potential and anxiety surrounding plasticity. A fresh, de- ossified 
approach to past counter- traditions and even forms of  disqualified know-
ledge and anti- science (Foucault, 2003) suggests that the present has not 
been reached teleologically. A chief  aim of  this book is to show that the past 
is never entirely displaced, thus complicating the supposedly clean points of  
rupture in historical epistemology (Rheinberger, 2010; Loison, 2016). The 
postgenomic moment with all its scientific controversies exemplifies the 
contingency and precariousness of  perceived epistemic closure. It uncannily 
overlaps ancient and very modern statements on the permeability of  bodies 
to surrounding conditions. It undermines and provincializes ideas of  a sup-
posedly monolithic Western thought based on notions of  stability and insu-
perable human– nature dualism, a cherished mythology for postmodernist 
and posthumanist authors.
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A different family album for the epigenetic body
This applies also to the case of  epigenetics, which I will describe in detail 
in Chapters 4 and 5. Through my pre- history of  the plastic body I aim to 
reframe the current rise of  interest in epigenetics within a broader history 
of  body– world configurations. Usually, the most common origin stories 
of  epigenetics cite Conrad H.  Waddington’s causal analysis of  cell differ-
entiation during development as its starting point (Waddington, 1957, 
1968; Peterson, 2017; Squier, 2017; Buklijas, 2018). In more radical cases, 
epigenetics can be dated back to the early nineteenth- century theories of  
Jean- Baptiste Lamarck (Gissis and Jablonka, 2011) or the experiments of  
interwar heretic biologist Paul Kammerer (Taschwer, 2016). These links 
are accurate accounts in terms of  molecular mechanisms and evolutionary 
debates. However, sociologically speaking, there is more to the present 
resurgence of  interest in epigenetics than just Waddington or Lamarck. If  
we look at epigenetics as a contemporary template for a certain plasticity of  
the body; if  we think of  an epigenetic body as continuously metabolizing its 
surroundings, penetrated by multiple influences; if  we think of  epigenetics 
as a proxy for a certain malleability of  heredity that extends beyond birth; 
if  we think of  race not as a fixed essence but as the embodied accumulation 
of  environmental exposures; if  we look at developmental origins of  health 
and disease (DOHaD) as resurrecting a view of  pregnancy as no longer a 
passive biological state but a moment of  acute permeability requiring a per-
manent regime of  vigilance; then none of  the above claims look new or 
exceptional, and epigenetic and related postgenomic views of  plasticity have 
a much deeper history to excavate.
I recognize that connecting the genealogical tree of  epigenetics to ancient 
and early modern views of  the body, such as humoralism, rather than 
twentieth- century explorations in embryology or molecular biology, goes 
against the grain of  mainstream views. However, I am persuaded that this 
longer reading, even at the cost of  losing some of  the fine- grained quality 
of  other approaches, presents multiple advantages, especially for a histor-
ical sociology of  the body. Firstly, it offers a strong corrective to the present 
over- identification “with the temporal economy of  innovation”, where the 
appropriation and resurfacing of  past themes is simply forgotten or denied 
(Cooper, 2017). Each age has its intellectual opium, and in contemporary life, 
innovation seems to be the winning one. In the Middle Ages, it was a point of  
honour to believe that ancient knowledge could not be surpassed. We seem 
to have made quite a radical inversion of  this position, but no less uncrit-
ical. We simply make it a point of  honour to ignore our past and overstate 
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the radicalism of  our present so as to equate the innovatory with the valu-
able. In order to produce the current state of  excitation and hype, the social 
imagination around biology must foreclose past histories of  plasticity. In 
contemporary scholarship, active forgetting (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008) 
and ignoring are the conditions of  accumulating new intellectual capital.10 
Taking a longer view of  the plastic body and looking at plasticity not as a 
riddle solved by contemporary Western science but as a ubiquitous belief  
in traditions predating and coexisting with modern medicine will help dis-
abuse ourselves of  the seeming radicalism of  today’s turn to permeability 
and the exceptionalism of  Western findings. It will help us understand that 
we must look beyond segmented studies of  history (the modernistic body) to 
recognize the long shadow cast over the present by the dispersed and complex 
roots of  notions of  corporeal plasticity.
Secondly, this genealogical approach helps conjoin twenty- first- century 
and earlier body– world configurations and epistemologies. It offers a 
unique opportunity to dislocate polarities between modernity and trad-
ition, Western and Southern medicine, and hegemonic and subjugated 
bodies of  knowledge, given the global ramifications of  humoralism as a 
form of  plasticity before plasticity. It does so by focusing not on the molecular 
mechanisms of  plasticity, but on plasticity as a form of  life, that is, a number 
of  ethical questions and related techniques of  existence about how to live 
with a permeable body and how to govern permeable populations with 
mutable racial traits. This allows us to problematize the utter separation 
between our modern science and body– world configurations based on 
ideas and practices of  bodily fluidity particularly in the Global South (for 
India: Langford, 2002; South Africa: Dubow, 1995; Philippines: Anderson, 
2006; Australia: Douglas and Ballard, 2008). This is a powerful antidote to 
the modernistic attitude of  authors who “believe in epistemic ruptures so 
radical that nothing of  that past survives in them” (Latour, 1993: 68). It is 
at the same time a key tool to problematize a “hypostasised” version of  the 
West as absolutely other to “traditional cultures and histories” (Washbrook, 
1997; Therborn, 2003). It is also important for developing a truly global 
study of  science (Raj, 2013) that considers the non- Euro- American areas as 
site of  knowledge production rather than of  passive recipients of  external 
expertise (Anderson, 2002). A global phenomenology of  the body plastic 
before and aside the modernistic body of  biomedicine can facilitate a more 
pluralistic study of  science.
Thirdly, universalizing biological plasticity as a sort of  default commitment 
contributes to a provincialization of  biological fixity. This is of  the utmost 
importance for a global sociology of  the body. It enables us to raise questions 
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about the specific construction of  the modernistic body of  biomedicine as an 
exceptional sociocultural endeavour. If  bodies have always been impression-
able, heavily engraved by the power of  external factors, how did we come to 
think of  biological identity, heredity and race as immured from the external 
world? How did we come to think of  ourselves as fixed and hardwired in 
genes? Rather than a generalizable case, biological fixedness (i.e. the gen-
etic view of  heredity), to paraphrase Walter Mignolo, is “a spectacular case 
of  a global design built upon a local history” (2000: 22). However, as with 
every case of  extraordinary intellectual success and hegemony, this intellec-
tual prodigy needs a serious intellectual engagement and sociologically aware 
explanation. The implicit question behind this book is therefore to address 
the emergence not so much of  current beliefs in plasticity as of  those in 
fixity and hardness of  bodies, race and heredity. How did a certain number 
of  white, northern European men, mostly of  Protestant background, come 
to equate biology with stability and lack of  porousness since the last decades 
of  the nineteenth century? Some of  these men  – Francis Galton, August 
Weismann, Ernst Mayr and Francis Crick – contributed to an insulation of  the 
biological from its milieu and ideas of  a hard nature writing at key junctures 
of  political developments: the making of  colonies and empires; nation- state 
building; the defeat of  totalitarianism; and Cold War deployment. As others 
have noted, these wider biopolitical projects have framed and saturated the 
modernistic understanding of  the biological body (Martin, 1994; Haraway, 
1999; Cohen, 2009). As children of  the twentieth century, we tend to believe 
that modernistic ideas of  the immured body and insulated germ- plasm still 
offer the natural choreography of  the relationship between the biological and 
the social, the fixed and the changeable. I don’t mean to make these men – 
Galton, Weismann or Crick – the scapegoats of  a cheap denunciation against 
modernism or individualism in biological theory. Their displacement of  ideas 
of  plastic bodies, races and heredity had, in several cases, an unquestionably 
emancipatory function (Meloni, 2016a). By highlighting how they worked 
against the grain of  long- established views, I want instead to understand bio-
logical individualism, or perhaps biological liberalism, as a very fragile con-
ceptual construct that may be already on retreat today (Gilbert et al., 2012; 
Bapteste and Dupré, 2013). Rather than being the default position, the notion 
of  autonomy of  the individual and disentanglement from environmental 
forces was achieved with great efforts in biological theory. Going through 
this history again may be particularly significant today, with claims of  a new 
absorption of  biology in its milieus again on the rise. It may also help provin-
cialize emphatic claims of  a vitality of  matter, or intense traffic of  body and 
milieu, that some postmodernist authors – unaware of  this deeper history 
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and blinded by the belief  in a monolithic ontology of  fixedness that has never 
been there – hope to rescue in the interstices of  a modernity that is more pre-
carious than they can ever imagine.
An alternative genealogy of biopower
Genealogy is an essential tool in challenging universalizing narratives about 
plasticity (or lack thereof ), as though there were a single and timeless 
human body. From a genealogical perspective, plasticity is less an ideal sig-
nification than the result of  historically situated techniques for constructing 
and governing mutable and porous bodies. It is also the effect of  some spe-
cific material phenomena and infrastructures, such as writing technologies, 
as I will claim later. Ancient and early modern plasticity was forged not in 
abstract philosophical discussions but in concrete biopolitical practices, med-
ical investigations and classificatory techniques to hierarchically distinguish 
between sexes and among ethnic groups on the basis of  their softness and 
vulnerability to the all- encompassing power of  the environment. Through 
medical, philosophical and climatological cartographies, the differential plas-
ticity of  various populations was used to separate ruling from ruled groups, 
Europeans (Greeks and later Romans) from Asians, temperate countries from 
the tropics. This inaugurated a tradition that lasted well into nineteenth- 
century colonialism: plasticity of  traits at the service of  military conquest and 
imperial designs (Osborne, 2000), but also plasticity as fear of  racial deterior-
ation after migrations to the new colonies, and hence unknown food, stars 
and climates (Earle, 2012; cfr. Stoler, 1995; Anderson, 2016).
The ancient biopolitics of  plasticity presents some recurring themes that 
are worth keeping in mind. One is the construction of  Oriental populations 
as softer, more delicate and unwarlike because of  the way they are shaped by the 
monotony or gentleness of  their climate. This trope can be found, to different 
degrees, in Hippocrates’ On Airs, Waters and Places, in Aristotle’s Politics and in 
later Roman authors. The argument about Oriental lack of  “manly courage 
(andreion)” was easily turned into a platform for imperial strategies (Kennedy, 
2016) and theories of  natural slavery (as in Aristotle’s Politics, 7.7). In the Middle 
Ages, the influential historian Gerald of  Wales (1147– 1220) still relied on this 
delicacy of  Eastern groups to suggest how to defeat them militarily (Irby, 2016). 
Noticeably, from the fifteenth century and the first global colonial invasions, 
a North– South axis based on latitude (Wey- Gómez, 2008) juxtaposed this pre-
dominant Orientalist construct to classify tropical populations as less capable 
of  governing themselves and being free. Aristotle’s Politics is a compendium of  
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all these ideas, with people living in temperate (mediocriter) places presented as 
the most capable of  producing the best political systems:
The nations inhabiting the cold places and those of  Europe are full of  
spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill, so that they con-
tinue comparatively free, but lacking in political organization and cap-
acity to rule their neighbours. The peoples of  Asia on the other hand 
are intelligent and skilful in temperament, but lack spirit, so that they 
are in continuous subjection and slavery. But the Greek race participates 
in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it 
is both spirited and intelligent; hence it continues to be free and to have very 
good political institutions, and to be capable of  ruling all mankind if  it 
attains constitutional unity.
(Pol. 1.327b23– 33, my italics)
Views of  direct environmental influence and the porosity of  bodies to these 
effects also entered the military machines of  ancient empires, like that of  the 
Romans. Officers, such as Vegetius (De re militari, I/ 2), suggested avoiding 
recruiting troops from cold climates as they had too much blood and, hence, 
inadequate intelligence. Instead, he argued, troops from temperate climates 
should be recruited, as they possess just the right amount of  blood, ensuring 
their fitness for camp discipline (Irby, 2016.). Delicate and effeminizing land 
was also to be abandoned as soon as possible, according to Manlius or Caesar 
(ibid.). Probably the most famous geopolitical dictum of  antiquity reflects 
exactly this plastic power of  places: “soft lands breed soft men”, according to 
the claim that Herodotus attributed to Cyrus.
The strict relationship between geography and virtue is one of  the most 
important biopolitical leitmotifs of  ancient and early modern history, reaching 
scholastic philosophers such as Albert the Great and early modern political 
thinkers, including Bodin and Montesquieu. The moulding influence of  geog-
raphy produced various cartographies of  racial and imperial domination based 
on soft, not hard, traits. While I will explore these and similar sites of  ancient 
plasticity more systematically in the next chapter, my point here is that this 
oft- forgotten history matters to counter versions of  biopower, colonial dom-
ination or racism as only being traceable to essentialist notions of  fixity and 
innateness. This is a fundamental anachronism for ancient and early modern 
times. The supreme power of  environmental effects was a key biopolitical dis-
positive of  past and early modern authors. Environmental tropes of  corporeal 
and racial plasticity were rarely used in a benign way. This is why we need 
to take a critical distance from the exquisitely twentieth- century notion of  
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environmental effects as “more imaginative, more rational and more humane” 
(Toynbee, 1934) than other forms of  biopolitics and racism.
However, is it appropriate to speak of  biopolitics regarding these wide-
spread environmentalist tropes? Is this an anachronism? It is undoubtedly 
an anachronism, but so is the usage of  the word in Foucault for eighteenth- 
century police science (Ojakangas, 2016a). It is not my ambition to challenge 
directly the Foucauldian idea that a true biopower starts from early modern 
absolutism, and is only partly anticipated by forms of  Christian pastorate 
(Foucault, 2003), but indirectly, I think I offer good evidence to problematize 
this claim. In the light of  the subtle complexity of  managing physiological 
functions under a humoralist framework, I find it hard to claim, as Foucault 
does, that biological life has entered into “history” and the spheres of  “political 
techniques” only “millennia” after the Greeks, at the threshold of  modernity 
(1978: 141– 142). I aim to complicate another claim in the light of  humoralist 
techniques of  the body (Chapter 2):  that of  a purportedly hard separation 
between bare and qualified life, zoe and bios (Agamben, 1998), according to 
which one can claim either that there was no contamination between cor-
poreal processes and the political realm in ancient times (Arendt, 1958), or 
that an originally separated bare life was excluded in order to be assumed 
within the paradigm of  power (Agamben, 1998). These (quite problematic) 
views of  ancient life have been used to support the notion either that there is 
only one overarching paradigm in the history of  biopower (Agamben, 1998)11 
or that there was no biopolitics or even politicization of  biological matter in 
the Greek world (Foucault, 1978). In recent years, Mika Ojakangas has argued 
against this latter thesis and in favour of  the legitimacy of  the category of  
ancient biopolitics. He has claimed that notions of  power in the Greek polis 
are connected to vital processes:
Ancient Greek political thought does not revolve around laws, juridical 
persons, free wills, contracts, and obligations, but around the technolo-
gies of  power over natural life whereby, to paraphrase Foucault, the 
basic biological features of  the human species become the object of  
political strategy.
(2016a: 141; see also 2016b)
I am sympathetic to this idea that there is a strange blindness in Foucault’s 
reading of  biopower in the Greek and Hellenistic world. However, unlike 
Ojakangas, my claim is that this story of  ancient biopolitics is only partially 
captured by the writings of  Plato and Aristotle. It is even less understand-
able by projecting onto Plato or Aristotle the traits of  the authoritarian 
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pedagogy of  early twentieth- century selectionist eugenics (Roper, 1913; 
Günther, 1928; see Forti, 2006). This version of  biopower is not the one 
I  aim to find with my analysis of  the ancient and early modern body. 
Firstly, neither Plato nor Aristotle shared the view of  racial purity or her-
edity of  mainstream early twentieth- century selectionists (see Klosko, 
1991). Both of  them thought in a very different framework: open to the 
influence of  nourishment upon heredity (Aristotle, Pol. 7.1336a3– 5) or 
even to the inheritance of  acquired characters (Plato, Laws 6.775d). They 
were definitely proto- racialist (Isaac, 2006), but in a sense quite different 
from our post- nineteenth- century view of  race. However, besides the 
philological readings of  Aristotle and Plato, I  take issue with Ojakangas’ 
interpretation because in focusing only on ancient philosophers, physio-
logical bodies become conspicuously absent. Authors like Agamben and 
Ojakangas who support notions of  ancient biopower miss the everyday 
physiological governance of  bodies that can be found in sources like 
Hippocrates or early modern moral treatises on the art of  living based on 
humoralist tropes. Here one can find more clearly the traits of  an ancient 
governmentality of  the body (individual but also collective) based on ideas 
of  corporeal malleability, environmental influences and biosocial effects. 
This is a different, more horizontal form of  biopolitics that impregnated 
day- to- day practices constructing ideas of  personhood, corporeal man-
agement, and recognition of  the body’s vulnerability to its surroundings. 
Interestingly, this older history of  a soft biopolitics may have some 
resonances with contemporary forms of  neoliberal governmentality 
and the somatic individual (Rose, 2007). In particular, one of  its key 
features stands out:  the tension between targeting individual behaviours 
and making collective identities and hierarchies among human groups. 
Ancient and early modern views of  the body, particularly but not only via 
humoralism, gave rise to initial forms of  biopolitics at the level of  both 
the political anatomy of  the individual body and forms of  government of  
populations. The former side has been highlighted particularly by Michael 
Schoenfeldt (1997): the porous humoralist body became the site for a quite 
specific art of  self- fashioning, in which prudence, to cite Foucault, vigilance 
and a “constant and detailed problematization of  the environment” were 
constantly reclaimed (Foucault, 1990:  101). Especially in the doctrine of  
the six non- naturals (Chapter 2), humoralism pushed people to enter into 
a certain relationship of  self- governance and self- examination with their 
own body. It was, for this reason, easily incorporated into liberal and even 
bourgeois doctrines of  individual health later in the eighteenth century 
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(Coleman, 1974). This was not an abstract view of  the legal individual 
but a truly biosocial view in which shaping and controlling bodily fluids, 
vital processes, pores and metabolism with the external world was of  the 
utmost importance. However, and this seems a blind spot in Foucault’s ana-
lysis of  ancient ethics, there was more than just individual techniques of  
the self  in ancient bodies, more than just self- reflexivization. Humoralist, 
physiological and wider environmentalist tropes became the platform 
for vast technologies of  power by which different groups and sexes were 
classified, and ultimately governed, on the bases of  their specific physi-
ology, permeability and corporeal fragility (Paster, 1993). Perhaps these 
strategies were not centralized, as in the eighteenth- century police science 
analyzed by Foucault. Nonetheless, they displayed that “double process” 
of  subjectivation and objectivation by which the production of  individual 
bodies “could also be described from the external perspective as a rela-
tionship of  power” (Detel, 2005: 34). This silent shift away from individu-
alization to the making up of  biosocial collectives (racialized, gendered) 
appears very profound in the history of  corporeal plasticity and may serve 
as a guiding thread to an alternative and longer history of  biopower.
Importantly, this longue durée perspective may also contribute to a socio-
logical history of  the “civilizing process” that aims to explain the making 
of  homo clausus (the separate, contained individual of  modernity) not as a 
starting point but as the culmination of  a long and conflicted historical pro-
cess (Elias, 2000). Unlike Elias, however, a focus on humoralism disconnects 
the emergence of  practices of  the self  (exclusively) from the making of  the 
absolutist state in sixteenth- century Europe. It also challenges the Eliasian 
notions that these disciplinary techniques were mostly based on a repression 
of  bodily fluids and evacuations. Humoralism gave rise to a more complex 
and sophisticated body– world configuration than this repressive hypothesis 
would have (Paster, 1993).
Embedding plasticity in a material history: Plasticity  
and sexual difference
If  we think of  corporeal plasticity as a last- minute invention without recog-
nizing the complex filiation of  contemporary notions and practices, we risk 
missing its present ambiguity and silencing its inherently political moment. We 
may overlook the idea that contemporary plasticity enables, at the collective 
level, forms of  gender and racial domination that go well beyond depoliticized 
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individual consumerism. The contemporary sociology and anthropology of  
plasticity very often avoid this historical depth and genealogical awareness. 
Plasticity is either celebrated as an ethical epiphany where a “whole new figure 
of  the neurological human emerged” (Rees, 2016: 278) or dismissed as a trick 
of  “neoliberal pressures of  self- care, personal responsibility, and constant flexi-
bility” (Pitts- Taylor, 2010: 640). Both these alternatives are unsatisfactory. They 
are modernistic assumptions (from the Latin modo, “just now”; see Cohen, 2009) 
that ignore the sedimented histories that precede and inform current body– 
world configurations, which may unfold again. The biopolitical shadow of  past 
usages of  plasticity is elided, in all its complexity and subtlety, and with that the 
material dispositive in which ancient plasticity was devised and conceived.
The exception to this modernistic understanding of  plasticity is Catherine 
Malabou’s work (particularly 2005). Uniquely among contemporary social 
commentators, Malabou has written important pages that trace plasticity back 
to its original Greek moment. She has particularly highlighted Aristotle’s key 
text De Anima as a source (via Hegel) of  modern debates on plasticity and 
its influence on anthropology. In De Anima, Malabou claims, the notion of  
“noetic plasticity” emerges as a profoundly duplex notion: “the originary unity 
of  acting and being acted upon, of  spontaneity and receptivity” (2005:  186). 
Following Malabou’s analysis is very helpful: we are still very much caught 
in this oscillation between agency and vulnerability, making and undergoing 
that, according to Malabou, exemplifies the Greek experience of  plasticity 
(ibid.,:  40). However, Malabou’s reading reflects an idealized view of  plasti-
city that remains unsatisfactory from a genealogical viewpoint. It obscures the 
embedment of  Aristotle’s work in a number of  highly gendered metaphors 
from which plasticity emerges in sublimated terms. This is where a historical 
sociology of  plasticity, which looks at its socio-material infrastructures, may 
work as a corrective to idealized philosophical readings.
The Aristotelian De Anima is, as commentators have observed, as much a 
philosophical treatise as a biological one (Shiffman, 2011). If  one reads the 
notion of  noetic plasticity against the wider background of  the Aristotelian 
corpus, and particularly his patriarchal view of  sexual reproduction, it will 
appear very clearly that the dual economy of  plasticity  – the interplay of  
moulding and being moulded – is embedded in a profoundly gendered imagin-
ation. Famously, in another work, the Generation of  Animals, Aristotle 
establishes his masculinist view of  embryogenesis based on the fundamental 
opposition between the male “as the active producer [poiētikon] and mover” 
and the female “as passive [pathētikon] and moved” (Generation of  Animals, 
I.21 729b15– 18; cited from Bianchi, 2014: 54). In this patriarchal view of  bio-
logical growth and sexual difference, male and female are distinguished by 
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the fact that the former possesses a certain power/ capacity to give form that 
the woman lacks. This reflects the basic idea for Aristotle that
the semen of  the male differs from the corresponding secretion of  the 
female in that it contains a principle within itself  of  such a kind as to 
set up movements also in the embryo and to concoct thoroughly the 
ultimate nourishment, whereas the secretion of  the female contains 
material alone.
(Generation of  Animals, IV.1, my italics)
This principle (or the “efficient cause of  generation”) is in fact originally a for-
mative force: the vital heat (pneuma) possessed by the male semen that has the 
power (dynamis) to shape forms during generation. The menstrual blood of  the 
female (menses or catamenia) is instead cold and, hence, deprived of  formative 
power. “The menses are seed but not pure seed”, Aristotle writes, “for it lacks 
one thing only, the source of  the soul”. Menses contains the inert material of  
generation and can only receive forms (Generation of  Animals, books II and IV, 
in particular 768 b15– 27).12 Aristotle’s Generation of  Animals, as philosopher 
Emanuela Bianchi writes, is “the hidden and therefore never adequately 
studied foundational book of  Western patriarchal metaphysics” (2014: 3).
Plasticity’s inherent dualism of  both “to fashion and to be fashioned” 
(Malabou, 2005: 40) looks much less mysterious if  one places Aristotle upon his 
biological and sociological feet, in the context of  ancient forms of  gender dom-
ination. The two sides of  plasticity, the power to shape and the vulnerability to 
receive forms, can be allocated to the paternal and the maternal causes, respect-
ively, in embryogenetic processes. The father will historically take the first side of  
plasticity: an active power that is the generator of  forms, a “maker”. Interestingly, 
Aristotle makes an explicit analogy between the male semen and a sculpting 
power, as something that can puts things into form, as in a “work of  art” (GA 
II. 4). The female embodies the second sense of  plasticity: a passive substrate 
upon which formative power is exerted. This second sense of  plasticity is nicely 
captured by Joseph Needham’s comment on Aristotle’s embryogenesis, when he 
writes that the “male dynamic element […] gives a shape to the plastic female 
element” (1959: 43). Female plasticity is no longer the power to generate but just 
to absorb alien forms. That this embryological background is one of  the keys to a 
genealogy of  plasticity finds further confirmation in the trajectory of  the notion 
of  “plastic power” or vis plastica, which became very influential in Renaissance 
debates (Hunter, 1950; Hirai, 2005 and 2016; Smith, 2006). Vis plastica can be 
traced back to embryological debates (mostly in Galen) where the active power 
of  the paternal semen (hotter than the female semen) is said to contain a special 
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moulding faculty: dunamis diaplastike, plastic power, because it moulds the inert 
female matter. This faculty, via the work of  Arab commentators like Avicenna, 
will transit to the Renaissance, becoming a “divine formative power” (Fernel, 
1548) or a “plastic”, spermatic logos, as in Schegk’s On the Plastic Faculty of  the 
Seed (De plastica seminis facultate, 1580). Cambridge Platonists in the seventeenth 
century will then turn this idea into a notion of  “plastick might” in the sense of  a 
transcendent intellect pervading and shaping all physical processes, not just foetal 
development (Hirai, 2005; 2007a and b; 2017). This is the only visible ‘biological’ 
usage of  the term “plasticity” before modernity. Its history betrays a very mascu-
linist origin in the radical asymmetry between the formative power of  the male 
seminal liquid and the maternal receptive matter.
The political materiality of plasticity:  
Impressionable biologies
This is just one possible example of  the way in which a genealogical approach 
may help not only trace forgotten filiations of  ancient plasticity but also re- 
embed its vocabulary into a very material history of  gender and race domin-
ation. There is a second genealogical route to diffract ancient plasticity through 
the prism of  its very material origin. This genealogical route inspires the title 
of  this book and my whole project of  defining biological matter as deeply 
imbued with social meanings, not just “malleable” but durably “impression-
able”. It comes directly from writing techniques in classical times:  incising 
marks on wax tablets using a small pointed metal tool (stilus) or sealing a block 
of  wax with a metal stamp to make official signatures in relief. This infrastruc-
tural aspect offered a key metaphorical repertoire by which Plato and Aristotle 
conveyed the idea of  marking a receiving surface. Importantly, this process of  
imprinting is often rendered with the Latin term impressio [from imprĭmo, in- + 
premō: to press in]. It is through this metaphor, as we saw above, that Aristotle 
defines plastic matter as an “impressible” matter in his Meteorology. The pro-
cess of  making an impression, Aristotle says,
is the sinking of  a part of  the surface of  a thing in response to pressure 
or a blow, in general to contact. Such bodies are either soft, like wax, 
where part of  the surface is depressed while the rest remains, or hard, 
like copper. Non- impressible bodies are either hard, like pottery (its sur-
face does not give way and sink in), or liquid, like water (for though 
water does give way it is not in a part of  it, for there is a reciprocal 
change of  place of  all its parts).
(Book IV, part 9)
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However, from this physics of  plasticity, metaphors of  impression are 
extended to much more complex models. Consider, for instance, two key 
passages in Plato and Aristotle, both translated by scholastic Latins with 
impressio. In the first, Plato famously compares the soul to “a block of  wax” 
and the mechanism of  memory to making “impressions from seal rings” 
upon it (Theaetetus, 191, c– e). In the second, Aristotle advances his influen-
tial theory of  signification by comparing sense perception to “the way in 
which a piece of  wax takes on the impress of  a signet- ring without the iron or 
gold” (De Anima, II, XII). Here the Latin word impressio translates the Greek 
sēmeion, sign. One could extend these examples to the whole of  antiquity, 
where metaphors of  the soul or the body as written or impressed upon were 
common currency. However, the word impressio often took a stronger and 
cruder meaning beyond the description of  a writing or sealing process. It 
overlaps with notions of  impetus, physical violence, assault, irruption, military 
attack. This more violent sense is well retained in the Latin version of  the 
Hippocratic treatise On Head Wounds (1999). Here, the text uses “impression” 
to refer to “the weapon which struck against the bone leaves its impression 
on the part which it struck” (part 7). Even more interestingly, at the intersec-
tion of  writing mechanisms and physical pressures, impressio became, in the 
Scholastic tradition, a template for any form of  “environmental” influences 
from heavenly bodies (corpora caelestia) onto inferior sublunary matter, 
including the Earth. This is, for instance, the sense in which it is used by 
Dante in his Divine Comedy when, describing the sun, he gives voice to Saint 
Thomas:
Lo ministro maggior de la natura,
che del valor del ciel lo mondo imprenta
e col suo lume il tempo ne misura.
Commedia III X 28– 30 (my emphasis)13
Dante is simply reflecting here a widespread usage of  metaphors of  
imprinting in scholastic times, from Albert the Great to Robert Grosseteste. 
This latter wrote in 1220 a treatise called De Impressionibus Elementorum, that 
is, The Impressions of  the Elements. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) himself  used 
the metaphor repeatedly. For instance, in his Summa Theologica, in an attempt 
to rescue free will from a too materialistic view of  the imprinting powers of  
celestial bodies, he claims that “it is impossible for heavenly bodies to make a 
direct impression on the intellect and will”. In so doing, however, he must con-
cede that celestial bodies can “be a dispositive cause of  an inclination to those 
operations in so far as they make an impression on the human body” (Summa 
Theol. II, II, 95 a 5; my emphasis). It is at this level that the widespread belief  
 
30 An archaeology of plasticity
in astrology in Latin scholasticism and early modernity can be understood 
as a part of  a general theory of  impression and bodily plasticity. Authors like 
Albertus the Great, or later Machiavelli and Ficino described via astrological 
themes (especially when it comes to electoral astrology, that is, the influence 
on the course of  everyday actions, not what is fixed at birth) a particular mal-
leability of  either the individual or the body politic to celestial influences.14
Interestingly, this framework of  a direct impression of  the heavens on sub-
lunary bodies is not gender neutral. Here we are brought back to the above 
point about plastic power and sexual difference. In Aristotle, several Arab 
commentators and the later scholastic tradition, the analogy between celes-
tial influences as a paternal power and the receptive sublunary matter as a female is 
quite literal. Impressions, as plasticity, originate from a masculine power to 
shape female matter. As Justine Smith writes, citing the Dominican philoso-
pher Antoine Goudin (1668):
according to Aristotle and Saint Thomas, earth and water furnish to 
everything arising from the bowels of  the earth their matter and bosom, 
as would a mother, while heaven and the stars fulfil the office of  the 
father, who imparts the form. A “male” formative principle exercises its 
influence over the “maternal” matter of  the earth and thereby gives rise 
to forms in earth that resemble living beings.
(2013: 262)
The general impressionability of  sublunary bodies is therefore an aspect of  
their feminine and susceptible nature. This recipient matter is shaped by the 
dispositions left “from the imprint of  the active principle (principii agentis)”, as 
medieval theologians used to say (Arens, 1984: 464).
It is finally worth noting that, besides this widely used sense of  a celestial 
influence on the earth, impression is also the framework through which the-
ories of  corpuscular vision and hearing are explained by scholastic thinkers 
(Aquinas, 1951). Notions of  impressions are used in epistemological debates 
(how truth impresses itself  into concepts) and even Trinitarian theology (how 
the Holy Trinity impresses its triune character upon the angelic hierarchy 
in Bonaventure). More significantly for future debates on the impression-
ability of  female matter, both sensory cognition and generation were often 
explained “in terms of  the impression of  the images on soft or subtle matter” 
(Park, 1998: 260). For this reason, they were seen “not only as cognate facul-
ties but faculties whose operation was physiologically linked” (ibid: 260, 262); 
hence one of  the sources of  the pervasive beliefs in maternal impressions – 
the capacity of  women to mark, imprint or deform the foetus through 
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“imagination” – which will represent one of  the key pathways of  plasticity 
until early modernity.
Overview of the book
The notion of  impressionable biologies aptly condenses the original non- 
modern intuition of  a body constantly exposed to an immense number of  
external influences. This was an attentive and excitable body, but also a 
body constantly under pressure, at the mercy of  the all- encompassing power 
of  the environment, physical and social, with profound patriarchal and 
racialist resonances. This vulnerable biological matter will be explored in 
the next chapter mostly through its most visible ancient and early modern 
champion, the humoralist body (Chapter  2). I  will then discuss how this 
original plasticity and explanatory models based on the appeal of  direct 
environmental influences had to be challenged by key nineteenth century 
authors in order to align the biological body to some key tenets of  modern 
liberalism: autonomy, inviolability and boundedness of  the individual body. 
I will focus on the contribution of  Darwin and Weismann and the emerging 
views of  heredity in genetics as quintessentially modernist strategies to dis-
place ancient plasticity. They all broke with the “Hippocratic imagination” 
(Cohen, 2009) of  a body circumfused by place. Darwin (at least for his 
selectionist thesis, given that his view of  heredity is deeply “Hippocratic”, 
i.e. pangenesis, as I  will argue below) and Weismann produced concep-
tual technologies to subtract or buffer the individual from environmental 
pressures. This move included the breaking of  ancestral ties to establish that 
individuals were born free, or at least unburdened by the actions of  their 
immediate ancestors. After the rise of  selectionism and later genetics, the 
environment was disentangled from the individual body, taking shape as a 
well- defined field of  forces that one could look at externally, that is, as alien 
to an authentic and irreducible self. The radical plasticity and ecological 
inspiration of  humoralism, a body of  flows and liquid forces (Paster, 1993), 
including its most sinister versions (racial degeneration as a consequence of  
colonial migrations or environmental exposures), started to look increas-
ingly problematic for late nineteenth century authors (Chapter 3). Chapter 3 
is somehow a self-standing unit in the context of  the book, but helpful to 
identify the moral implications of  the nurture first/nature first debate that 
are resurfacing today in epigenetics.
In the third and final part I will discuss how epigenetics may open once again 
the door to a view of  the permeable body in the language and framework of  
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twenty- first- century molecular biology. I read with interest and curiosity the 
emerging wave of  epigenetic literature, and am sympathetic to many of  its 
efforts to put this knowledge in the service of  under- represented groups and 
communities (Chapter 4). My main concern, however, reflects the lesson I have 
learned from the history of  the plastic body: a body shaped from and traversed by 
outside matter is also a body vulnerable to a number of  disciplinary practices and 
forces, open, that is, to “governmental intensification” (Rose, 1996). Albeit it 
may seem old- fashioned to claim this nowadays, biological liberalism – with its 
art of  separation and boundary- making (Walzer, 1984) – had kept these forces 
contained through a strong notion of  individual autonomy and physiological 
insulation. This withdrawal of  the individual body from the towering power of  
the external environment gained momentum in nineteenth- century biomed-
ical thought also because it could be perceived as a technology of  freedom. 
The question in the final chapter is therefore what happens in postgenomics as 
a post- liberal biological world in which the individual is submerged again by 
environmental forces at the molecular level. I focus in particular on the emer-
gence of  the complex figure of  plasticity generated by epigenetics: a plasticity 
that is neither about modernistic control (that is, responding to the desire of  an 
agent- master) nor about endless potentialities, as in postmodernist narratives 
of  fluidity and decentering of  the subject. Epigenetics’ emerging plasticity is 
not explainable in the above terms; instead, it is closer to an alter- modernistic 
view that disrupts clear boundaries between openness and determination, indi-
vidual and community. The resonance of  this notion with older epistemolo-
gies of  the body and non- Western ecological views may explain the growing 
interest and appeal of  epigenetics in postcolonial areas beyond the mainstream 
scientific Global West, as I highlight in the final chapter (Chapter 5).
Notes
1 Postgenomics is usually taken as a temporal label, to reflect a period inaugurated 
with the completion of  the human genome project in 2003. However, in 
my reading I  will favour the notion that postgenomics is a different “style of  
reasoning” (Hacking, 2002) compared with genomics – one that emphasizes the 
permeability of  the genome to material surroundings and the plasticity of  its 
functioning. I will define the term and its history more extensively in Chapter 4.
2 Antonyms are not really “opposite”. While opposition implies incompatibility 
(single/ married), antonyms are gradable pairs whose meanings are oppositional 
along a continuum (such as dry/wet). Some authors in semantics take opposites 
also to be a kind of  binary antonyms, so in this case plasticity and elasticity would 
be “gradable antonyms” (see Lyons, 1977).
 
 
 
 
